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Comments
Who is Encroaching Whom? The Balance
Between Our Naval Security Needs
and the Environment:
The 2004 RRPI Provisions as a Response
to Encroachment Concerns
"Defense and the environment is not an either-or proposition
. . . . To choose between them is impossible in this real world of
serious defense threats and genuine environmental concerns. The
real choice is whether we are going to build a new environmental
ethic into the daily business of defense. "1
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 24, 2003, President Bush signed into law the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 authorizing
"$400 billion dollars over the next fiscal year2 to prepare the military for
all that lies ahead." 3 Not only did this Act provide the Department of
Defense ("DoD") with financial resources, but the Act also provided the
DoD with relief from critical environmental legislation. Embedded in
the Act, as part of the military's broader Range and Readiness Preserva-
tion Initiative ("RRPI"), were provisions reducing the DoD's obligations
under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and the Marine Mammal
Protection Act ("MMPA").4 The DoD claims these circumventions
have been necessitated by population growth and urbanization as well as
expanding environmental legislation, regulation, and litigation which,
1. Dianne Dumanoski, Pentagon Takes First Steps Towards Tackling Pollution, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1990, at 79 (quoting then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney).
2. The fiscal year for the U.S. Government runs from October first through September
thirtieth and in this case the budget authorization was retroactive.
3. Press Release, President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at Signing of H.R.
1588, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Nov. 24, 2003), available at
2003 WL 22766865.
4. See National Defense Athorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. 108-136, §§ 318-
19, 117 Stat. 1392, 1433-35 (2004). The alterations to the Endangered Species Act include the
prohibition of the Secretary to designate as critical habitat any lands that are owned by, used by, or
controlled by the Department of Defense if certain administrative burdens are met. Furthermore, it
stipulates that when determining the designation of critical habitat, the impact of that designation
on national security must be considered.
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DoD says, taken together impede our military forces from being in their
most "ready" state.5 The military has baptized this phenomenon
"encroachment," and through the RRPI legislation has sought to remedy
some of these hindrances by seeking the amendment of several environ-
mental laws.6
Issues of encroachment7 have recently taken on greater importance
as the armed forces have felt increased pressure to be prepared for the
worst in the aftermath of the war on terrorism and the lingering senti-
ment regarding September eleventh. The balance between the protected
(our land, people, and resources) and the protectors (our armed forces) is
in constant flux. In order to train our protectors to be as prepared as we
expect them to be, our armed forces need the ability to experience realis-
tic and authentic combat training situations, 8 which in turn necessitates
the destruction or harming of the land and the inhabitants that the forces
are in place to protect. It is intuitive that in order to safeguard our
nation, some sacrifices to our natural surroundings must be made, but
the issue remains as to which situations warrant such sacrifices and to
what extent these sacrifices should be made.9
5. DoD Range and Readiness Preservation Initiative ("RRPI"), Briefing for [illegible]
Standing Committee on [illegible] Law, at slide 4, Mar. 31, 2003 (on file with author).
6. The Range and Readiness Preservation Initiative of 2002 includes eight proposed
amendments to the ESA, MMPA, Migratory Bird Treaty Act ("MBTA"), the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensations and Liability Act ("CERCLA") to relieve the military from environmental laws
that the military believes hamper their ability to train in realistic combat situations.
7. From a DoD perspective, encroachment is defined as, "the cumulative result of any and
all outside influences that inhibit necessary training and testing." Critical Challenges Confronting
National Security-Continuing Encroachment Threatens Force Readiness: Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Government Reform Oversight, 107th Cong. (2002) (Statement of Dr. Paul W.
Mayberry, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness), & Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, Jr.,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment)). Encroachment also
includes, "external influences, such as environmental laws and regulations, threatening or
constraining testing and training activities on DoD ranges and facilities required for force
readiness and weapons acquisition." United States Army Legal Services Agency, Environmental
Law Division Notes: Encroachment: Putting the "Squeeze" on the Department of Defense (DOD),
2001 ARMY LAW. 33, 33.
8. The difference realistic training can make in battle has been shown through the past
experiences of the DoD.
Realistic demanding training has proven key to survival in combat time and again.
For example, data from World Wars I and II indicates that aviators who survive
their first five combat engagements are likely to survive the war .... The ratio of
enemy aircraft shot down by U.S. aircraft in Vietnam improved to 13-to-I from less
than 1-to-I after the Navy established its Fighter Weapons School, popularly known
as TOPGUN.
Endangered Species Programs on Defense Department Lands: Testimony Before the Comm. on
House Resources, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Rear Admiral Robert T. Moeller, Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Policy, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Department of the Navy),
available at 2003 WL 11717909 [hereinafter Statement of Rear Admiral Moeller].
9. STEPHEN Dycus, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3 (1996).
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The 2004 amendments to the MMPA were designed to allow the
Navy greater flexibility in the testing and training of active sonar tech-
nology: powerful sonar capable of actively detecting underwater objects.
Opposition to the use of such technology, and thus, the amendments,
stemmed from the fact that high-intensity sonar has been and still
remains linked as a cause of world-wide mass beachings of whales and
dolphins and of changes in marine life behaviors. Before the amend-
ments reached the floor of Congress through the defense budget, this
struggle between the Navy's use of active sonar and the protection of
marine mammals under the MMPA had already played out in a limited
way in a federal courtroom. The interplay of the legislative amendments
with the litigation casts a unique light on this piece of RRPI legislation
raising questions about the appropriateness of these particular amend-
ments as a response to the war on terror. By passing the fiscal year 2004
provisions, the United States government made the decision that in the
quest for balance, the use of active sonar in realistic combat training was
such a situation which warranted the sacrifice of our natural resources.
However the insight of the litigation and the extent of the amendments
suggests that in making such a decision, Congress, in its concern to
equip our armed forces with the resources they deemed necessary to
fight the war on terror, did not use the caution, concern, and restraint
which the circumvention of such important protective legislation
warrants.
This Comment will focus on the Department of the Navy, a branch
of the Department of Defense, which has recently been in the forefront
of these issues. Part II of this Comment provides an overview of active
sonar technology and examples of its possible effects on marine life.
Part III looks to the historical issue of encroachment and explores the
issues of encroachment which the Navy has been facing and the Navy's
attempts to deal with these issues over the past thirty-five years. Part IV
explores the lawsuit of Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans' °
which brought to head issues of encroachment under the MMPA when
the Northern District of California issued an injunction in August of
2003 to limit the Navy's use of low frequency sonar." Part V analyzes
the amendments included in the National Defense Authorization Act of
FY 2004, birthed from the broader Range and Readiness Preservation
Initiative, by examining how these amendments interact with the deci-
sion in NRDC v. Evans and answer the encroachment concerns asserted
by the DoD. Finally, Part VI compares the purposes of both the envi-
ronmental legislation against those of the Navy to ascertain whether
10. NRDC v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
11. See id.
20051
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there has been an appropriate balance of the interests of naval security
with the protection of the environment and human health.
II. THE PROTECTOR (ACTIVE SONAR) &
THE PROTECTED (MARINE LIFE)
On the fifteenth of March 2000, fourteen beaked whales, one spot-
ted dolphin, and two minke whales stranded themselves along one hun-
dred miles of Bahamas coastline while the U.S. Navy was conducting
exercises offshore using powerful sonar technology. 12 In response to the
beachings, the Navy launched an investigation which, after removing
and dissecting the heads of the whales, revealed that "the pattern of
damage [was] most consistent with acoustic trauma."13 "Some type of
auditory structural damage findings [were] present in all four beaked
whales examined (all showed bloody effusions or hemorrhage near and
around the ears)."' 4 The "investigation team conclude[d] that tactical
mid-range frequency sonars aboard U.S. Navy ships that were in use
during the sonar exercise in question were the most plausible source of
this acoustic or impulse trauma."'" The report also concluded that
although the exposure to sonar units was the cause of the injuries, the
sonar did not kill the whales directly, but instead drove the whales up on
to the beaches where they were stranded, leading to their deaths.'
6
Beachings of cetaceans' 7 have been on the increase in the past
years and fingers are pointed to the use of low- to mid- frequency active
sonar, otherwise identified as high-intensity sonar, as the cause of this
escalation. 18 It is often the fact that a military warship is within range to
the beachings, as was true in the latest strandings of eighty rough-
toothed dolphins off Marathon, Florida in March of 2005 and of thirty-
12. Betsy Carpenter, Sound and Fury: Whale Deaths Blamed on Sonar Have Triggered a
Heated Debate About Man-made Noise in the Sea, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 23, 2002,
at 50.
13. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. & DEP'T OF THE NAVY, JOINT INTERIM REPORT:
BAHAMAS MARINE MAMMAL STRANDING EVENT OF 15-16 MARCH 2000, at 13 (2001) [hereinafter
BAHAMAS STRANDING INTERIM REPORT].
14. Id. at 38.
15. Id. at ii.
16. Id. at 46-47.
17. The word cetacean describes animals which belong to the order Cetacea "which includes
fishlike acquatic mammals such as the whale and porpoise." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 255 (2d. college ed. 1991).
18. See Torcuil Crichton, Sharp Rise in Whale Deaths Leads to Call for Sonar Ban, SUNDAY
HERALD (London), July 13, 2003, at 4; see also Ian Sample, Sound Effect Navy Sonars Blamed for
Beached Whales, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 9, 2003, at 12 (stating that powerful naval sonars
are most likely to blame for a series of mass whale beachings in recent years); Michael Hastings,
Whale Killer; Scientists Have New Evidence That Sonar Damages Ocean Wildlife, NEWSWEEK
INT'L, Oct. 20, 2003, at 70 (stating that strandings in the Canaries, Greece, the Bahamas, and off
Puget Sound all coincided with sonar tests).
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four whales in January of 2005 off the coast of North Carolina.19 The
Florida beaching began "within twenty-four hours, and perhaps less, of
exercises conducted off Key West by the USS Philadelphia. '20 In North
Carolina, six Navy ships had been practicing hunting submarines off the
coast, causing particular concern for residents of North Carolina as the
Navy considers the waters off of North Carolina as one option for the
placement of a sonar training range.2' In the past twenty years, mass
strandings and deaths linked to nearby high-intensity sonar exercises
have been identified in Hawaii (2004), Washington State (2003), the
Canary Islands (2004, 2002, 1989, 1986, 1985), the Bahamas (2000),
Madeira (2000), the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (2002, 2000), the
U.S. Virgin Islands (1999, 1998), and in Greece (1996).22 However, as
it has only been recently understood that warships may be a direct cause
of the beachings, there may be other instances which have not yet been
identified.
A. Active Sonar Technology
Active sonar technology differs from passive sonar technology in
that rather than passively listening for sounds emitted by an object in the
ocean, an active sonar system will transmit sound itself and then listen
as that sound bounces off of objects. 23 This mimics the natural echo-
location systems which some marine mammals use to navigate and hunt
for food. 24 Active sonar falls into three different categories: "low-fre-
quency, which travels the farthest and is often used for search and sur-
veillance; mid-frequency, commonly used in training; and high-
frequency, which is the weakest. ' 25 Both low- and mid- frequency
sonars fall under the umbrella of high-intensity active sonar which have
19. Jennifer Babson, Dolphins' Beaching Closely Followed Sub's Exercises, THE MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 5, 2005, at Al; Catherine Clabby, Study Might Save Whales From Ill Effects of
Navy Sonar, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), Feb. 28, 2005.
20. Id. Of the eighty stranded dolphins, twenty returned to sea, fourteen were euthanized, and
more than thirty were being cared for in order to rehabilitate them. Id. Necropsies were being
taken to determine if the dolphins suffered acoustic damage. Id.
21. Kate Wiltrout, Sonar Under Scrutiny, VIRGINIA PILOT & LEDGER-STAR (Norfolk), May 3,
2005, at 1.
22. Letter from Joel Reynolds, NRDC; Alexander Likhotal, Green Cross International; Jean-
Michel Cousteau, Ocean Futures Society; Frederick M. O'Regan, International Fund for Animal
Welfare; Naomi A. Rose, Ph.D, Humane Society International; & Mark Simmonds, Whale &
Dolphin Conservation Society to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 6-9 (Feb. 9, 2005)
[hereinafter Letter to NATO], available at http://www.nrdc.org/media/docs/050210a.pdf.
23. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, SURTASS LFA Systems Description, http://www.surtass-lfa-eis.
com/Description/index.htm (last visited July 31, 2005).
24. Id.
25. Jennifer Babson, Dolphin Beaching Puts Navy on Defensive About Sonar, PIrSBURGH
POST-GAzETTE, May 9, 2005, at A8.
2005]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:577
been associated with dolphin and whale beachings and it is the military-
developed low-frequency active sonar ("LFAS") which was the subject
of the litigation analyzed in Part IV.26
In order to detect an object, the active sonar transmits "pings" of
acoustic noise.27  These "pings" are omnidirectional. Low-frequency
sonar can last from six seconds to one hundred seconds with intervals
between them ranging from six to fifteen minutes2 8 whereas mid-fre-
quency sonar lengths and intervals will generally depend on the speci-
fied task.29 At the source, low-frequency active sonar projects at an
approximate level of 215dB, although it is contended that at the conver-
gence zones where the signals begin to combine, the acoustic level can
reach 240dB. 3 ° This is by no means a quiet device; levels of 215dB
have been equated to standing next to a fighter jet as it takes off.3"
LFAS can be heard at great distances from the vessel, with levels of
140dB32 recorded more than four hundred miles from the source ves-
sel.33 In the 2000 Bahamas stranding the Navy used mid-frequency
26. This Comment will focus on low- and mid- frequency sonars; for ease of reference, they
will be referred to collectively as high-intensity sonar or separately identify the sonar by its
particular name. The major difference between the two is their potential impact as "low-
frequency sound waves travel very efficiently in seawater [and therefore] sound from these
systems has an even greater geographic reach than mid-frequency sonar and, thus, an even greater
potential for environmental harm." Letter to NATO, supra note 22, at 5. In the March 2005
beaching in the Florida Keys, both mid- and high-frequency active sonar was used. Babson, supra
note 25.
27. A ping is a complete sequence of sound transmission. See Taking and Importing Marine
Mammals; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to Navy Operations of Surveillance Towed Array
Sensor System Low Frequency Active Sonar, 67 Fed. Reg. 46712, 46712 (July 16, 2002) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt 216) [hereinafter Final Rule]. Passive sonars detect acoustic waves
generated by an object and work in concert with active sonars by gathering the information from
the active sonar pings. See United States of America Department of the Navy, SURTASS LFA
Systems Description, http://www.surtass-lfa-eis.com/Description/index.htm (last visited July 31,
2005).
28. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 46712-13.
29. BAHAMAS STRANDING INTERIM REPORT, supra note 13, at 23. For example, constant
frequency signals are more useful for detecting movement whereas frequency modulated signals
work best in areas where there may be environmental reverberation (although they do not detect
movement as effectively as constant frequency signals). Id.
30. Final Rule, supra note 27, at 46712; see also Letter from Joel Reynolds & Michael Jasny,
Senior Attorney & Project Associate (respectively), Natural Resources Defense Council, to Donna
Wieting, Chief, Marine Mammal Conservation Division of the National Marine Fisheries Service
(May 31, 2001) (copy on file with author), available at http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/cjrmj
0501 .asp.
31. Profile: Navy Wants to Use Powerful Sonar System, But it May Hurt Underwater Marine
Life (ABC News: World News Tonight television broadcast, July 16, 2002).
32. The Department of Labor limits workplace exposure to noise at 115dB for fifteen minutes
a day maximum and forbids exposure to impulsive or impact noise beyond 140dB. Occupational
Noise Exposure, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95 (2005).
33. NRDC v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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sonar at source levels exceeding 235dB34 creating levels of 160dB
which could be heard at distances of approximately twenty-one miles."
These distances that a sonar ping may travel are influenced by such fac-
tors as "water temperature, salinity, topography and the presence of
other objects in its path."
36
High-intensity sonar is employed by the United States Navy as a
"critical element of its antisubmarine warfare" program, and such an
active sonar, the Navy says, is vital to the detection of the quieter diesel
submarines that are now patrolling our oceans. 37 Active sonar "enables
ships to search a larger area more quickly than any other sensor, and it
provides the only accurate targeting data for the ship's antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) weapons. ''38 The reliance on active sonar stems from
the fear that passive sonar technology will not detect these quiet subma-
rines in a timely manner allowing the enemy submarines to be able to
offensively use their weapons against U.S. interests. The Navy views
these quiet submarines as "the ultimate stealth weapons" and any unde-
tected enemy submarine as an "underwater terrorist, threatening any sur-
face ship or coastline within its range."' 39 The DoD regards submarine
warfare as a sincere threat to our security:
The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China have
demonstrated that the submarine is a centerpiece of their respective
navies. Published naval strategies and current operations of potential
adversaries, including Iran and North Korea, have demonstrated the
same strategic doctrine. Diesel submarines are deemed a cost-effec-
tive platform for the delivery of several types of weapons, including
torpedoes, anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-ship mines and nuclear
weapons. In addition to the United States, Australia, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, 41 other countries, including potential adversary
nations such as China, North Korea, and Iran, have modem quiet sub-
marines and many are investing heavily in submarine technology.4 °
Ironically, the use of the high-intensity system will allow enemies to
detect the vessel which employ the sonar more easily. However, despite
relaying the location of the vessel using the active sonar, such detection
permits detection of the enemy submarine long before it poses a danger
34. BAHAMAS STRANDING INTERIM REPORT, supra note 13, at 23.
35. Id. at 28.
36. See Babson, supra note 25 (noting that the exact ranges of military sonars are classified).
37. See Statement of Rear Admiral Moeller, supra note 8; United States of America
Department of the Navy, Why the United States Needs SURTASS LFA, http://www.surtass-lfa-
eis.com/WhyNeed/index.htm (last visited July 31, 2005).
38. BAHAMAS STRANDING INTERIM REPORT, supra note 13, at 56.
39. See United States of America Department of the Navy, Why the United States Needs
SURTASS LFA, http://www.surtass-lfa-eis.comlWhyNeed/index.htm (last visited July 31, 2005).
40. Statement of Rear Admiral Moeller, supra note 8.
2005]
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to the surface vessel. 4 1
B. Marine Mammals
1. MARINE MAMMALS AND HIGH-INTENSITY SONAR TECHNOLOGY
Many scientists believe that the use of high-intensity sonar technol-
ogy may be a cause of what seems to be a global increase in whale
strandings. There are two theories of how the sonar affects the
cetaceans, causing them to beach themselves. The first theory is that the
whales' sensitive sonar detectors are directly damaged by the strong
acoustic waves from the high-intensity sonar, causing pain and disorien-
tation which drives the whales to strand themselves on the beach.42 This
theory explains the ruptures and hemorrhaging found in some of the
whale and dolphin victims. The second theory is that the exposure to the
loud sonar noise causes the whales to become disoriented and confused,
compelling them to the surface too quickly which causes decompression
sickness otherwise known as "the bends" to SCUBA divers.43
Concerns have also been raised by fishermen about the use of high-
intensity sonar technology and the collapse of fish stocks, particularly
after an Australian study showing that fish exposed to 160dBs at the
same frequency and duration as LFAS uses suffered internal injuries,
eye hemorrhaging, auditory damage, and mortality." A Norway study
also showed that catch rates of haddock and cod fell between forty-five
and seventy percent over a two thousand square mile area while low-
frequency air guns were being used and did not increase for five days
after the use of the guns.45 There is also concern from the whale-watch-
ing industry that high-intensity sonar systems will change the migration
patterns of whales, causing disappointment for the tourists and damage
to the industry.46 One of the challenges of active sonar is capturing the
actual effects of the use of such sonar. Changes in breeding, migratory,
or feeding behaviors in the vast amount of marine species over large
geographical areas is difficult to observe, making it quite probable that
the effects may be even more pervasive and damaging than those which
scientist have been able to concretely identify.
Such damage to marine eco-systems has become a concern on a
41. See id.
42. Carpenter, supra note 12.
43. P.D. Jepson et al., Gas-bubble Lesions in Stranded Cetaceans: Was Sonar Responsible for
a Spate of Whale Deaths After an Atlantic Military Exercise?, 425 NATURE 575 (2003).
44. David Telfer, MEP Urges Probe Into Impact of Seismic Devices on Fish Stocks,
ABERDEEN PRESS & JOURNAL (United Kingdom), June 30, 2003, at 19.
45. Id.
46. This is especially a concern for Hawaii where a decrease in migrating whales has been
observed after tests of LFAS systems last year.
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global level as it is not just the U.S. Navy employing such technology.47
International bodies, such as the IUCN-World Conservation Union and
the European Parliament have called upon their members to use high-
intensity sonar technology with restraint and caution.48 The Interna-
tional Whaling Commission, after a report by the Standing Working
Group on Environmental Concerns which addressed, among other items,
the military's use of sonar, has identified noise as a priority issue.49 One
country, Spain, has taken actual steps to protect marine mammals by
introducing "a sonar exclusion zone around the Canary Islands."50 This
was prompted by strandings in 1988, 1989, 1991, as well as 2002, all of
which were linked to naval exercises of its coasts.51 An additional
aspect of international concern is that high-intensity sonar is simply
extremely loud noise pollution, albeit not so obvious to humans, within
sea waters which have become increasingly noisy due to intensified and
escalated use.52
2. MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT OF 1972
For over thirty years Congress has vested responsibility in the Fed-
eral Government to conserve marine mammals through the Marine
Mammal Protection Act.53 Marine mammals, under the act, include
those mammals physically structured to survive in the marine environ-
ment, including sea otters, whales, dolphins, and manatees, or those
mammals, such as polar bears, which primarily inhabit the marine envi-
ronment 4.5  The MMPA was passed based on the fact that certain marine
mammals, "are, or may be, in danger of extinction or depletion as a
result of man's activities," and that "there was inadequate knowledge of
the ecology and population dynamics of such marine mammals."55 Con-
47. Low-frequency sonar is known to be used by the naval forces of the United Kingdom,
NATO, France, and the Netherlands. Letter to NATO, supra note 22, at 5. Mid-frequency sonar
is known to be used by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Canada, Norway,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, NATO, and other countries. Id. at 4.
48. Id. at 12-13.
49. Id. at 11-12.
50. Richard Sadler & Geoffrey Lean, Hi-Tech Military Sonar Systems 'Are Killing Britain's
Whales and Dolphins,' INDEPENDENT (London), June 19, 2005, at 17.
51. Id.
52. There are worries that increased underwater acoustic noise due to increased traffic on the
oceans, use of underwater drilling and LFAS are creating a LOUD environment for all types of
marine creatures. In fact a recent phenomenon of fatal collisions between ships and whales has
been on the increase due to the combination of the speed, traffic, small crews, bigger vessels, and
increased acoustic noise which does not allow the whales enough time to hear the approaching
ship. See Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, Whale Collisions: Full Speed
Ahead, http://www.peer.org/campaigns/whales/index.php (last visited July 31, 2005).
53. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C, §§ 1361-1421(h) (2005).
54. Id. § 1362(6).
55. Id. § 1361(1), (3).
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gress further found that "marine mammals were resources of great inter-
national significance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic, and
... they should be protected and encouraged to develop to the greatest
extent feasible. ' 56 The MMPA reflects an intention to broadly protect
marine mammals as its protective measures apply not just threatened
species, but to all marine mammals.
As well as being broad, the MMPA is rigorous with its protection
of marine mammals by "prohibit[ing], with certain exceptions, the take
of marine mammals in U.S. waters and by U.S. citizens on the high
seas." 57 A taking, according to the statute, has occurred when a marine
mammal has been harassed, hunted, captured, or killed or if there has
been an attempt to harass, hunt, capture or kill a marine mammal.58
Although a take may impact a wide variety of activities and people, the
statute does allow for some flexibility and provides for exceptions
including exemptions for certain native peoples for subsistence and for
scientific research (with the appropriate permit and authorization).59
Further, the government recognized that during commercial fishing
operations, there would be incidental takings of marine mammals and
created permits, authorizations, and regulations to control those inciden-
tal takings. 6° These extensive protections are further monitored by the
Marine Mammal Commission, an independent commission that is to
"provide independent oversight of the marine mammal conservation pol-
icies and programs being carried out by the federal regulatory agen-
cies."" Despite the flexibility added into the MMPA, it remains one of
the tougher pieces of environmental legislation, allowing a taking only
with a permit. The combination of these protective mechanisms is indic-
ative of the seriousness with which our nation meant to protect these
mammals and further reflects the need to maintain such meticulous pro-
tection for another thirty years and beyond while increased pressure
develops on the stocks with the increased use of the oceans.
III. ENCROACHMENT AND THE NAVY
The struggle between the use of high-intensity sonar and marine
mammal protection is not the first encroachment issue with which the
Navy has been dealing. The military's tension with environmental pro-
56. Id. § 1361(6).
57. NOAA Fisheries: Office of Protected Resources, Laws & Policies, Marine Mammal
Protection Act, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/laws/mmpa.htm (last visited July 31, 2005).
58. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (2005).
59. Id. § 1371(b), (a)(l).
60. Id. § 1371(a)(2).
61. Marine Mammal Commission, About, http://www.rnmc.gov/about/ (last revised May 21,
2004).
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tection began with the advent of environmental legislation and has fluc-
tuated in intensity with public opinion and priorities. As the military has
taken on more responsibilities as a steward of the environment, it has
concurrently subjected itself to environmental laws which have
restrained its activities and to litigation taking its diligence in protecting
the environment to task.
Perhaps of all the branches of the military, the Navy exposes itself
to the greatest level of environmental regulation as it is a unique military
service in that it uses land, air, and sea in the performance of its opera-
tions and training. In the sea, the Navy operates submarines and ships
including cruisers and destroyers as well as using forces such as the
Navy Divers.62 On land, the Navy employs such operative forces as the
Seabees, SEALS, and Marines.63 The Navy also operates a fleet of
twelve aircraft carriers, each containing seventy-five to eighty-five
fighter/attack aircrafts.64 Additionally, the Navy makes use of an
amphibious assault force consisting of troops and equipment which
travel on both water and land.65 Whenever the Navy performs an activ-
ity it must therefore be mindful of the impact it may have on land, air, or
water and the cadre of environmental law which accompanies each
resource. Moreover, the Navy functions and trains along a treasured and
highly-protected eco-systems: our coastlines. Coastlines, critical to
Naval operations and necessary for port and land-sea access, have been
recognized for their uniqueness and special challenges as they are, "rich
in a variety of ... resources of immediate and potential value" as well as
containing habitat areas which are, "ecologically fragile and conse-
quently extremely vulnerable to destruction by man's operations.
66
The use of resources in such fragile environments both terrestrial and
marine, exposes the Navy to a host of environmental legislation, particu-
larly ESA, Coastal Zone Management Act and others, and compels the
Navy to regulate its behavior within the contours of the wide-range of
environmental laws.
This part provides a chronological overview of the changing atti-
tude of the military to the environment. Section A and B describe situa-
tions where citizens have challenged Naval activities to practically
demonstrate the issues of encroachment that the Navy faces in its opera-
62. Navy, Explore the Navy: Navy Life, http://www.navy.com/navylife (last visited July 31,
2005).
63. Id.
64. Navy, Explore the Navy: Navy Life, Aircraft Carriers, http://www.navy.com/aircraft
carriers (last visited July 31, 2005).
65. Navy, Explore the Navy: Navy Life, Amphibious, http://www.navy.com/amphibious (last
visited July 31. 2005).
66. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465, 1451 (2005).
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tions. Section C describes the military's transformation to a protector of
the environment, and section D describes a pre-September eleventh
attempt to hold the military to even higher standards and the subsequent
roll-back of military compliance with environmental regulation through
the RRPI package.
A. Initial Naval Interactions With Encroachment
Before the 1970s there were few environmental laws with which to
contend and the Navy had a fairly free reign to protect the sovereignty of
the United States and the people living within without much questioning
by the populace. Although awareness and concern of environmental
issues had always existed in some form, the idea of reflecting those con-
cerns through the law in the United States was just rearing its head.67
The first major shift came in 1962 when Rachel Carson published her
famous book, Silent Spring, which drew people's attention to the effects
of the unrestrained use of pesticides and chemicals in our daily lives and
to our health.68 It took a few years to turn that warning into action, but
with the beginning of the 1970s came a dramatic increase in the amount
of environmental legislation and the commencement of people's appre-
ciation of their responsibility to the earth around them.69
67. For a synopsis of global environmental history from ancient civilizations to the present
see William Kovarik, Environmental History Timeline, http://www.radford.edu/-wkovarik/env
hist/ (last visited July 31, 2005).
68. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
69. See William Kovarik, Environmental History Timeline, 1970-1980, http://www.radford.
edu/-wkovarik/envhist/9seventies.html (last visited July 31, 2005). The seventies saw the passing
of valuable environmental legislation such as Federal Water Pollution Control Act (known as the
Clean Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2005) (CWA) (passed over President Nixon's veto),
Federal Insecticide, Fungide, Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2005) (FIFRA), Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2005) (TSCA), National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2005) (NEPA), Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j
(2005) (SDWA), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2005)
(RCRA), amendments to create the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2005) (CAA),
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2005) (ESA), Marine Mammal Protection
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h (2005) (MMPA), and others. See id.; National Resource Defense
Council, E-law: What Started it All?, http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/helaw.asp# (last revised
May 5, 2000). The Environmental Protection Agency also came into existence in 1970. See
William Kovarik, Environmental History Timeline, 1970-1980, http://www.radford.edu/
-wkovarik/envhist/9seventies.html (last visited July 31, 2005). The decade also saw the
launching of many civil society organizations, such as National Resource Defense Council (1970),
Friends of the Everglades (1970), Worldwatch Institute (1974), and Earth First! (1979) as well as
events targeted at protecting the environment such as the Earth Day (on April 22, 1970) and
World Environment Day (June 5, 1977, which marks the beginning of Kenya's Green Belt
Movement with the planting of seven small saplings). See William Kovarik, Environmental
History Timeline, 1970-1980, http://www.radford.edu/-wkovarik/envhist/9seventies.html (last
visited July 31, 2005); National Resource Defense Counsel, E-law: What Started it All?, http://
www.nrdc.org/legislation/helaw.asp# (last revised May 5, 2000).
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On January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA) came into effect requiring all agencies of the Federal Gov-
ernment to create a systematic approach for considering the environmen-
tal consequences of a proposed project during the planning process, and,
moreover requiring that for "every recommendation or report on propos-
als for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment," the agency involved must pre-
pare an environmental impact statement (EIS). 7° NEPA is considered to
be "our basic national charter for protection of the environment ' 7 and
exists to ensure that "environmental information is available to public
officials and citizens" 72 so that "public officials make decisions that are
based on [an] understanding of environmental consequences, and take
actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment. ' 73 Legally,
the Federal Government, including the Navy, was now required to think
about the environmental implications of their activities and measure
their environmental costs. Because NEPA was construed by the courts
to be entirely procedural, "an agency was free in principle to make a
foolish decision but not an uninformed one."7 4
One of the Department of the Navy's first encounters with
encroachment litigation involved NEPA. The case of Citizens for Reid
State Park v. Laird" exemplifies the struggle between protection of the
environment and military readiness. In January 1972, a group of Maine
citizens sought to enjoin the Navy from embarking on Operation Snowy
Beach, a series of land, air, and amphibious landing and training exer-
cises conducted over a period of five days in a Maine state park.76 Oper-
ation Snowy Beach involved nine hundred men camping out for four
nights in tents, two helicopter landings, seven amphibious tractors land-
ing on the beach, and training exercises in the woods.77 There would be
no live ammunition used, no trees cut, no vehicles off roadways or des-
ignated areas, and personnel would use portable chemical toilets.78 The
Navy had not compiled an environmental impact statement (EIS) on
whether Operation Snowy Beach would significantly affect the quality
of the human environment; however, the record showed that the Navy
70. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2005).
71. Dycus, supra note 9, at 12 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1.500.1(a) (2005) which explains the
purpose, policy and mandate behind NEPA).
72. 40 C.F.R. § 1.500.1(b) (2005).
73. Id. § 1500.1(c).
74. Dycus, supra note 9, at 13 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
75. Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (1972).
76. Id. at 784.
77. Id. at 785.
78. Id. at 785-86.
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had conducted inspections of the exercise area, consulted with the public
officials, and considered the scope and the character of the operation
before concluding that "the total impact of the operation would be
slight" and that Reid State Park was the only area on the Eastern sea-
board suitable for this exercise. 79 The court declined to review the
Navy's preliminary determinations that there would be no significant
environmental effect, and therefore no need for an EIS, where NEPA
"plainly commits [such] ... determination[s] to the agency" and where
the statutory language regarding environmental effects was "extremely
broad and not susceptible to precise definition."8 Thus the court limited
its function to a determination of whether the agency's decision "has
warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law."'" To ensure that
the training went forward as scheduled the next day, the court dismissed
the action with prejudice and with costs.8 2
Initial cases, like this one, demonstrate the beginning of what the
DoD would later label encroachment: in this case, a citizen group forc-
ing the Navy to court to justify its failure to issue an EIS before it con-
tinued with its scheduled training. The frustrations from both sides are
evident and understandable. The Navy, which had been planning Opera-
tion Snowy Beach since the spring of 1971, was in court the day before
the training was to take place83 defending its actions and pleading with
the court to allow the training to go forward as the Navy felt that Reid
State Park was the only area appropriate for a realistic exercise and if
prohibited from training at the park, its only alternative was to cancel the
entire operation.84 Conversely, Maine citizens were concerned that nine
hundred marines arriving by land, air, and sea into the park, camping for
five days, and performing training exercises throughout that time would
necessarily create a significant environmental impact on the park and the
Navy, as required by law, should have to think about the environmental
consequences of its actions by performing a full EIS so that areas of
mitigation could be identified.85 The court accepted the Navy's decision
79. Id. at 788. Under NEPA, an agency must also determine whether or not the impact of its
action will be significant enough to warrant a full EIS. In these cases, the agency prepares an
Environmental Assessment (EA) to determine if a full EIS is required and if the agency
determines that no EIS is required, then the agency must issue a finding of no significant impact
(FONSI). Dycus, supra note 9, at 12-13 (citations excluded).
80. Citizens for Reid State Park, 336 F. Supp. at 789.
81. Id. at 789 (quoting Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965)).
82. Id.
83. The court's order is dated January 21, 1972, whereas the facts state that the training was
to take place January 22-26, 1972. See id. at 783-84.
84. Id. at 788.
85. "The park has approximately one and one-half miles of shoreline and contains
approximately 800 acres, consisting of sand beach, sand dunes, two salt marshes and wooded
uplands." Id. at 784.
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not to file an EIS by recognizing the "full good faith compliance with
the substantial and procedural requirements" and limiting its review of
the Navy's interpretation of "significant" to "whether the decision has
warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law."86 Although not
explicitly taking into consideration national security needs vis-a-vis mil-
itary training in its opinion, such factors most likely played a role in the
court's decision-making process due to the continued involvement of
U.S. troops in Vietnam87 and the Navy's all-or-nothing attitude.88
B. Persona Non Grata
Due to the fact that the nature of naval operations involve the sea,
the Navy has bases all over the world including in places that most
would consider picturesque.89 Warfare training for the Navy by neces-
sity entails the use of these scenic areas. The following are two
encroachment examples where compliance with environmental legisla-
tion and subsequent litigation by native peoples spanning over many
years has literally evicted the Navy from two of its training grounds.
1. THE PACIFIC FLEET: HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
One of the first cases in which the Navy argued to the court that an
injunction would have an effect on its readiness capabilities is Aluli v.
Brown.90 This legal conflict between the Navy and citizens of Hawaii
concerned over the island of Kaho'olawe,91 the smallest of the eight
main islands of the State of Hawaii, arose in 1976 and finally reached a
conclusion in November of 2003.92 Kaho'olawe was used by the Navy
86. Id. at 788-89. Subsequent C.E.Q. regulations would implicitly reject this interpretation of
"significant." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2005) (requiring considerations of both context and intensity
when interpreting "significantly"). Moreover, the courts would explicitly incorporate the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review a year later. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823
(1973) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to NEPA); see also Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard to decisions under the APA).
87. As of January 1, 1972, 133,000 U.S. servicemen remained in South Vietnam; the last U.S.
troops left Vietnam on April 30, 1975. See PBS, Battlefield Vietnam, Timeline, http://www.pbs.
org/battlefieldvietnam/timeline/index3.html (last visited July 31, 2005).
88. The Navy claimed that if the court would not permit Operation Snowy Beach to take
place at Reid State Park, that the "only alternative was cancellation of the operation." Citizens for
Reid State Park, 336 F. Supp. at 788.
89. On the its recruitment website, the Navy entices potential recruits with images of
Australian beaches, Spanish sunsets - two of the ten ports of call that the Navy has in the world
spanning six of the seven continents. See Navy, Explore the Navy, Experience the World, The
Navy Around the World, www http://www.navy.com/experiencetheworld/navyaroundtheworld
(last visited July 31, 2005).
90. Aluli v. Brown, 437 F. Supp. 602 (D. Haw. 1977).
91. The citizens sued as individuals and also as the Protect Kaho'olawe Association.
92. Although concern for the island originated before the year 1976, it was in that year that
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"as a site for aerial and surface bombardment" from 1941 to 1990 when
the Navy was ordered to halt the exercises.93 Approximately one quarter
of the forty-five square miles of island 94 was used by the Navy for weap-
ons delivery practice to hit targets by both air-to-ground and ship-to-
shore exercises.95 The island had been uninhibited when the Navy
began its training there, however it had at one time been occupied.96
The Navy had performed an EIS in 1972 and had found that eleven of
the fifty identified archaeological sites were in the normal target zone.97
Further archaeological surveying was in the process of being completed
when a group of concerned citizens brought suit attempting to enjoin the
Navy's bombing activities. 98
Although the court found that the Navy was in violation of NEPA
and Executive Order No. 11593 (entitled "Protection and Enhancement
of the Cultural Environment") and its implementing regulations, the
court denied injunctive relief to the concerned citizen plaintiffs.99 The
court accepted the Navy's testimony that "the military readiness of the
Third Fleet would be reduced by 30 to 40 percent" and found that this
reduction in military readiness would substantial enough to tip the bal-
ance of hardships decidedly towards the Navy.100 The court also found
that the Navy did in fact consider alternative sites for their military
maneuvers, however that their reasons for rejecting these sites were rea-
the lawsuit was filed and when people began staging formal protests. See Bruce Dunford,
Ceremony to Mark Return of Kahoolawe to the State, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETnN, Oct. 23, 2003,
[hereinafter Dunford, Ceremony] available at http:llstarbulletin.com2003110/23inews/index14.
html; Brian Dunford, Hawaii's 'Target Island' Finds Some Peace, Los ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 22,
1995, at B5 [hereinafter Dunford, 'Target Island'].
93. Aluli, 437 F. Supp at 605. Kaho'olwe was officially placed under the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of the Navy in 1953 by President Eisenhower and thereafter reserved for naval purposes.
See id. In 1990 President Bush ordered the cessation of military use of the island. See Dunford,
Ceremony, supra note 92; Dunford, 'Target Island,' supra note 92. The island was finally
officially handed-over from the Navy to state of Hawaii's Kaho'olawe Island Reserve
Commission on November 12, 2003. See Dunford, Ceremony, supra note 92. The Navy used the
island during WW I, WW 1i, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and throughout the Cold War;
use of the island was critical in finding a design flaw in the Mark XIV torpedo during WW II. See
Navy Hawaii, Environment, Kaho'olawe: Meaningful, Safe Use, Military History, http://www.
hawaii.navy.mil/Environmental/Environmental_Index.htm (last visited July 31, 2005).
94. Kaho'olawe is eleven miles long and six miles wide at the widest point. Auli, 437 F.
Supp. at 605.
95. Id.
96. Only domestic sheep and feral goat were present on the island at the time of the transfer
and at the time of the lawsuit, Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 605-06.
99. Id. at 611-12; National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f
(2005); Exec. Order No. 11,593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8,921 (May 31, 1971). The plaintiffs had asked the
court to enjoin the Navy from using live ordinance on the island until the Navy had complied with
the requirements of both NEPA and Executive Order No. 11593. Id. at 610.
100. Id. at 611.
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sonable.10 t The court omitted from its analysis of substantial hardship
that were it to issue the injunction, "the readiness of the Third Fleet
would only suffer until it reformulated and published an EIS as required
under the statute." 
10 2
Despite the court's sympathetic ear to the loss of military prepared-
ness, the Navy's elusion of an injunction was no victory.I°3 The Navy
was ordered to comply with the NEPA requirements as well as those
applicable to Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environ-
ment."° This also marked the beginning of a battle of the Hawaiian
citizens to regain control of the island in order to preserve its natural
habitat and the archaeological sites in the spirit of their tradition of aloha
'aina or love of the land. 10 5 "Until the end, military leaders insisted
Kahoolawe was vital for training Pacific-area forces," and even implied
that a prohibition to use the island may affect decisions on the Navy's
presence in Hawaii.' 06 In the end, military training was halted, and the
Navy agreed to leave, however not without the remediation of the island:
the Navy was appropriated four hundred million dollars to fund a ten-
year clean up of the island 0 7 after which another eighteen million was
appropriated for the Navy to finalize its clearance operations and demo-
bilize from the island.' 0 8 The Navy calls this "the most extensive unex-
ploded ordnance cleanup project in history" involving three million
101. Id.
102. Kathleen Margareta Ryder, Vieques' Struggle for Freedom: Environmental Litigation,
Civil Disobedience, and Political Marketing Proves Successful, 12 PA. ST. ENvTL. L. REV. 419,
428 (2004). Those impacts would have been negligible in the long term as the court ordered that a
draft EIS be prepared within forty-five days. Aluli, 437 F. Supp. at 612.
103. The Navy did achieve somewhat of a victory when the case on appeal reversed the
holding that an EIS had to be compiled annually for each annual appropriation. See Aluli v.
Brown, 602 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1979) (reversing Aluli to the extent that it required an EIS to be
filed for annual appropriation requests).
104. Whereas NEPA requires an EIS to be performed, the Executive Order requires that
Federal agencies locate potential sites for the National register of Historic Places and exercise
caution until inventories evaluations are performed on those sites. See Exec. Order No. 11,593, 36
Fed. Reg. 8,921 (May 31, 1971).
105. The next years would see a series of civil disobedience occupations of the island and
include two arrests and imprisonments, two drownings, and bitter legal battles. See Dunford,
Ceremony, supra note 92; Dunford, 'Target Island,' supra note 92.
106. Dunford, 'Target Island,' supra note 92. Defense spending ranks second behind tourism
in the Hawaiian economy. Id.
107. Press Release, Kaho'olawe Island Reserve Commission, U.S. Navy to Return Island of
Kaho'olawe to Hawai'i (Oct. 22, 2003), available at http://kahoolawe.hawaii.gov/press/Pressrel
102203.pdf. The cleanup activity lasted from 1993 to 2003. "Federal law specifically states that
the United States is responsible and liable for the unexploded ordnance and environmental
remediation on Kaho'olawe." Press Release, Kaho'olawe Island Reserve Commission, Navy
Completes Withdrawal From Kaho'olawe (Apr. 8, 2004), available at http://kahoolawe.hawaii.
gov/press/press-rel040804.pdf (quoting Commissioner Burt Sakata of the Kaho'olawe Island
Reserve Commission).
108. Press Release, Kaho'olawe Island Reserve Commission, U.S. Navy to Return Island of
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hours of cleanup and the removal of over ten million pounds of scrap
metal and unexploded ordnance."0 9 In this case pleas to save the envi-
ronment and culture backed with the force of environmental legislation
and steady challenges through litigation wore down the Navy's resis-
tance to maintaining the island for its sea and air target-practice.
2. THE ATLANTIC FLEET: VIEQUES
A situation similar to that of Kaho'olawe arose in the Atlantic
ocean on the island of Vieques: after sixty years of using the island for
war maneuvers and twenty years of legal battles, the Navy has left the
island." 0 Vieques is an island within the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, located in the Caribbean. The island provided an ideal tactical
location for an air and naval base and consequently the U.S. government
purchased two-thirds of the island in the 1940s. 111 The people who
lived on the island were resettled to other locations on the island or to St.
Croix.1 12 It was not until the 1970s when the use of Vieques intensified
due to the threat of the Cold War and the Navy's leasing of parts of the
island for use by other countries. 1 3 Due to this increased military pres-
ence, civilian jobs were lost and in an attempt to revitalize the economy,
the Puerto Rican government embarked on a plan to build a resort on the
island; this plan was refused by the Navy for fear that their training
would be reduced due to the tourist presence on the island. 1 4 In 1979
the power struggle began: faced with an economically depressed people
and armed with the environmental legislation completed that decade, the
Governor of Puerto Rico, the Mayor of Vieques, and other citizens
15
filed suit against the Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, claiming vio-
lation of over fifteen environmental laws and executive orders and seek-
ing to enjoin the Navy from using any portion of the land in Vieques or
Kaho'olawe to Hawai'i (Oct. 22, 2003), available at http://kahoolawe.hawaii.gov/press/Press-rel
102203.pdf.
109. Navy Hawaii, Environmental, Kaho'olawe: Meaningful, Safe Use, http://www.hawaii.
navy.mil/Environmental/EnvironmentalIndex.htm (last visited July 31, 2005).
110. Indymedia.org, U.S. Navy Leaves Vieques After 60 Years of Bombing, May 8, 2003,
http://www.viequeslibre.addr.com/start.htrn-.
11. Ryder, supra note 102, at 420. Initially Congress planned on building an air and naval
base comparable to Pearl Harbor, however after the bombing of Pearl Harbor the plans for
building at Vieques were scaled back as the government did not want to risk everything in one
location. Id. at 420-21.
112. Ryder, supra note 102, at 421.
113. Id. The Navy leased the island for use by the French, English, Italian, and Dutch
militaries. Id.
114. Id. at 422.
115. The governor at that time was Carlos Romero Barcelo and Radamees Tirado Guevara was
the Mayor of Vieques. Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp 646 (D.P.R. 1979). The suit consolidated
two separate actions. Id. at 651.
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the waters surrounding the island for naval training operations. 16 Dur-
ing the initial trial which lasted three months the court heard the testi-
mony of sixty-three witnesses, displayed hundreds of exhibits, and even
took two field trips to the island of Vieques. 11 7 In this case, as in Citi-
zens for Reid Park v. Laird,I" the Navy asserted the argument that Vie-
ques is the only location where the Atlantic Fleet could conduct the full
range of exercises under conditions similar to combat. 19 In the end,
despite finding that the Navy was in violation of the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act ("FWPCA"), Executive Order 11593, and NEPA, the
court would not issue an injunction as to do so "would cause grievous,
and perhaps irreparable harm, not only to Defendant Navy, but to the
general welfare of this nation."12 The court did order the Navy to com-
ply with the law, while also identifying Vieques as "the only location
presently available wherein this training [involving air-to-ground ord-
nance delivery, Marine amphibious assaults, anti-submarine warfare,
surface-to-air missiles, close support bombardment, and electronic war-
fare] can be conducted within permissible peace time parameters."' 21
This case wound its way up to the Supreme Court with the nar-
rowed purpose of determining whether a violation of the FWPCA
required an immediate injunction of all discharges of pollutants identi-
fied as not complying with the Act or whether the court had discretion to
order other relief to obtain compliance.' 22 The court found that there
was discretion under the act.'23 A tennis match of litigation ensued over
the next years as the Navy lashed back with a suit of its own against the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico appealing the denial of water quality cer-
tification concerning the Navy's application for a discharge permit at its
Vieques Island training facility.' 24 Lawsuits brought by civil society
organizations and interested citizens also persisted to keep the courts
busy and the Navy's attorneys and management occupied through the
next years. 1
25
The resistance to the military's use of the island for military exer-
116. Barcelo, 478 F. Supp at 651-52.
117. Id. at 652.
118. Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (1972).
119. Barcelo, 478 F. Supp at 708.
120. Id. at 707.
121. Id. at 708. The Navy was ordered to seek an National Permit Discharge E S Permit, to
nominate sites on Vieques eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places, and to
comply with the EIS provisions of NEPA. Id.
122. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). The First Circuit had found that
the court had no equitable discretion under the Act. Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st
Cir. 1981).
123. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 320.
124. United States v. Puerto Rico, 721 F.2d 832 (1983).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Zenon, 711 F.2d 476 (1st Cir. 1983); Water Keeper Alliance v.
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cises reached a pinnacle in 1999 when a civilian security guard was
killed and five other people injured after a five hundred pound bomb
was accidentally dropped in the wrong location. 12 6 The resistance now
gained renewed vigor and popular support. 12 7 On May 1, 2003, the U.S.
Navy ceased all operations, withdrew from its holdings and turned over
control to the U.S. Department of the Interior.1 28 But that was not then
end of the Navy's ties to the island. On February of 2005 the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA") placed the Atlantic Fleet Weapons
Training Area, which was on the island of Vieques, on the Superfund
National Priorities List, a list of the most hazardous waste sites in the
United States.12 9 The EPA believes that the military training which took
place on the island may have caused the land and water to be contami-
nated with such substances as mercury, lead, copper, magnesium, lith-
ium, perchlorate, TNT, napalm, depleted uranium, PCBs, solvents, and
pesticides.13 ° Furthermore, Puerto Rico has estimated that cleanup of
the island will reach four hundred million dollars.' At the closure of
the facility the U.S. government had only allocated 2.3 million dollars,
however that amount will increase in tandem with the implementation of
the closure plan. 13 2 Additionally, the Navy now has one less base which
is, apparently, the only base in the Atlantic where the Navy could create
United States, 271 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001); Vieques Conservation & Historical Trust v. Bush, 140
F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.P.R. 2001).
126. See Natalia Munoz, WMass to Host Vieques Activists, THE REPUBLICAN (Springfield,
Ma), Mar. 7, 2005, at B2; see also Indymedia.org, U.S. Navy Leaves Vieques After 60 Years of
Bombing, May 8, 2003, http://www.viequeslibre.addr.com/start.html; Howard Wolinsky,
Charming Isle Sheds Military; With U.S. Gone, Vieques Seeks Way, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Dec.
26, 2004, at 1.
127. The accidental bombing brought some public figures to assist the cause at Vieques
including the Dalai Lama, Hillary Clinton, Jesse and Jacqueline Jackson, and Ricky Martin.
Howard Wolinsky, Charming Isle Sheds Military; With U.S. Gone, Vieques Seeks Way, CHICAGO
SUN TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, at 1.
128. Press Release, United States Department of Defense No. 291-03, Department of Navy
Transfers Vieques Property (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/
2003/b04302003_bt291-03.html; Pableaux Johnson, A Relaxed Jewel of the Caribbean Vieques
Emerges From Years of Isolation, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 18, 2005, at 22. The island
property has not been returned to the people of Vieques as the U.S. government is completing its
environmental assessments. Indymedia.org, U.S. Navy Leaves Vieques After 60 Years of
Bombing, May 8, 2003, http://www.viequeslibre.addr.com/start.html.
129. Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Places the Atlantic Fleet Weapons
Training Area on Vieques on the Superfund National Priorities List (Feb. 7, 2005), EPA 05-011,
2005 WL 281373 (E.P.A.).
130. Id.
131. Indymedia.org, U.S. Navy Leaves Vieques After 60 Years of Bombing, May 8, 2003,
http://www.viequeslibre.addr.com/start.html.
132. Press Release, United States Department of Defense No. 291-03, Department of Navy
Transfers Vieques Property (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/
20031b04302003_bt291-03.html; DEP'T OF THE NAVY, DRAFT FINAL CLOSURE PLAN OPEN BURN/
OPEN DETONATION SITE FORMER ATLANTIC FLEET WEAPONS TRAINING FACILITY VIEOUES.
2005] NAVAL SECURITY NEEDS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 597
experiences as close to war-like conditions as possible. Ironically, Vie-
ques is turning into an "undiscovered jewel" and a tourist destination
due to the fact that the Naval occupation of the island prevented the
large-scale development that has overtaken neighboring islands.' 33
C. Defense and the Environment: A New Policy of Responsibility
Embarrassment may have been the single largest factor that moti-
vated the Department of Defense to regard environmental regulation as a
part of its mission. The enactment of environmental laws had not signif-
icantly change the methods in which the military trained and operated
until 1989, when three civilian DoD employees were charged under
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 134 for criminal viola-
tions including the illegal waste storage and disposal.' 35 The Fourth Cir-
cuit flatly rejected the argument that sovereign immunity barred
prosecution and affirmed the convictions. 136 As a result of the disrepute
the convictions of his employees brought and the simultaneous criticism
of the DoD's environmental record, Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney,
"issued a memorandum to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force declaring that 'the Department of Defense [will] be the Federal
leader in agency compliance and protection. We must demonstrate com-
mitment with accountability for responding to the Nation's environmen-
tal agenda.' "137
The conviction of the DoD employees and the challenge of Secre-
tary Cheney inaugurated the decade of the nineties with a new sense of
importance to the environmental agenda within all federal agencies, and
particularly within the DoD. Since then, the DoD has committed time
and both human and capital resources to its environmental programs.
The Navy first developed an environmental budget in fiscal year 1991 at
a level slightly over one and a half million dollars. 3 ' In the latest
budget appropriation for fiscal year 2005, this figure increased approxi-
PUERTO Rico (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/region02/vieques/interimobodclosureplan.
pdf.
133. Neighboring islands are facing the impact of high-rise hotels and chain restaurants
whereas Vieques maintains a quaint undeveloped feel with white sandy beaches and, until it's
handed back to the people from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, one of the Caribbean's largest
wildlife refuge. See Johnson, supra note 128.
134. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (2005).
135. United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990).
136. Id.
137. Nancye Bethurem, Environmental Destruction in the Name of National Security: Will the
Old Paradigm Return in the Wake of September 11?, 8 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
109, 115 (2002) (quoting Seth Shulman, Operation Restore Earth, ENVIRONMENT, March/April
1993, at 38).
138. The FY 1997 Department of Navy Environmental Budget: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement
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mately one hundred and eighty-fold to almost 266.8 million dollars, a
figure which was a reduction from the environmental appropriations in
the fiscal year 2001 budget.1 39 This money goes to a variety of areas
which the Navy has determined to be important to their environmental
program including: cleanup, compliance, conservation, pollution pre-
vention, technology and BRAC, or Base Realignment and Closure.
In addition to initiating a culture of compliance with environmental
laws within the Navy, the Navy also started using the same environmen-
tal laws offensively to shift environmental liability and cleanup respon-
sibility to responsible private entities. For example, under NEPA the
courts found the former owners of Concord Naval Station property were
responsible for the cleanup costs required there. 140 The Navy to this day
retains its financial and human resource commitment to the environment
subject to the recent caveat that environmental laws cannot stand in the
way of the Navy's military readiness. The Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations/Plans and Policy for the U.S. Pacific fleet summed up the
tension in his Statement to the House Committee on Resources concern-
ing RRPI and asking for amendments to the MMPA and ESA:
We face numerous challenges and adversaries that threaten our
way of life. The President has directed us to "be ready" to face this
challenge. To fulfill this directive, we must conduct comprehensive
and realistic combat training - providing our Sailors with the experi-
ence and proficiency to carry out their missions. This requires appro-
priate use of our training ranges and operating areas and testing
weapons systems. The Navy has demonstrated stewardship of our
natural resources. We will continue to promote the health of lands
entrusted to our care. We recognize the responsibility to the nation in
both these areas and seek your assistance in balancing these two
requirements. 4
D. Twenty-First Century Dichotomy: RRPI and the Military
Environmental Responsibility Act
1. THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT
On June 13, 2001, Congressman Filner 142 introduced the Military
of Cheryl A. Kandaras, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Installations and
Environment).
139. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L.
108-375, § 301(14), 118 Stat. 1811, 1840 (2004).
140. United States v. Allied Signal Corp., 736 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
141. Statement of Rear Admiral Moeller, supra note 8.
142. Congressman Filner from California represented fellow Representatives McKinney
(Georgia), Pelosi (California), Degette (Colorado) and Lewis (Georgia).
[Vol. 59:577
NAVAL SECURITY NEEDS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Environmental Responsibility Act 43 to the House of Representatives.
This legislation was revolutionary in its approach to defense and the
environment. Its purposes were threefold:
1. To require the Department of Defense and all other defense-
related agencies of the United States ... to comply with all Fed-
eral and State laws that are designed to protect the environment or
the health and safety of the public to the same extent as all other
entities are subject to those laws.
2. To entirely waive any and all sovereign immunity and to entirely
revoke any and all exemptions of the Department of the Defense
and all other defense-related agencies of the United States within
the United States and abroad that might in any way limit or
exempt those agencies from complying with all Federal and State
environmental laws designed to protect the health and safety of
the public or the environment.
3. To leave no ambiguity for the executive or judicial branches that
the Department of Defense and all other defense-related agencies
are fully subject to all the requirements and possible enforcement
of all Federal and State environmental laws designed to protect the
health and safety of the public or the environment.' 44
This law, if it had been enacted, would have leveled the playing field to
make the DoD subject to those same laws to which every other citizen or
entity of the United States is subject domestically and internationally. It
was a daring piece of legislation that would have eliminated "all the
defense and national security exceptions and exemptions from all envi-
ronmental laws."' 4 5 The Military Environmental Responsibility Act
would have further meant "a complete waiver of sovereign immunity,
unitary executive privilege and the requirement to comply with all of the
local, state and federal environmental laws."' 46
We will never know if America was ready for such bold legislation,
as two months later was the ill-fated date of September 11, 2001. The
status of security and the environment shifted. After an attack on Amer-
ican soil, Americans no longer felt completely safe. Our priorities
shifted and Congress was ready and obligated by public mandate to pro-
vide the military with the tools and support it felt it needed to protect the
nation. In the wake of September eleventh, the military is feeling added
pressure to perform, to always be "ready" and as RRPI legislation is
passed, the military relieves itself from complying with legislation that it
feels hampers its ability to be prepared for an attack.
143. Military Environmental Responsibility Act, H.R. 2154, 107th Cong. (2001).
144. Id. § 2.
145. Bethurem, supra note 137, at 123.
146. Id.
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2. THE RRPI PACKAGE
RRPI legislation was in development before September eleventh;
the legislation was not a response to the attacks, but rather the DoD
seized the opportunity to pass through the legislative process those areas
of legislation which had already been identified as encroaching on the
DoD's ability to protect the country. The Navy, in particular, had devel-
oped a Maritime Sustainability Issues and Action Plan in December of
2000.1' The Navy had already identified the MMPA as a case in point,
claiming that, "[o]riginally enacted to regulate commercial fishing
impacts on dolphins, it has been applied by courts, environmental activ-
ists, and federal regulatory authorities to restrict military training."' 48
The draft action plan criticized the precautionary approach 49 of the reg-
ulatory agencies and identified three uncertainties of the MMPA: vague
legislative/regulatory definitions of what constitutes an "effect" (this is
in relation to the MMPA's definition of harassment as a "taking" of a
marine mammal); lack of quality data (for determining a proposed action
on distribution and abundance of marine mammals and sea turtles); and
limited scientific understanding of acoustic impact on marine mam-
mals. 5 The draft action plan further identified three areas which
restricted DoD training operations and testing: buffer areas, restrictions
on night-time operations, and prohibitions on the use of explosives.1"'
Congress was first introduced to the notion of encroachment during
the Encroachment Hearings before the Committee on Government
Reform on May 9, 2001.152 In 2002 the DoD presented to Congress the
Readiness and Range Initiative of 2002.153 It was a package of eight
proposals, three of which were passed in the 2003 fiscal year appropria-
147. Pre-Decision Working Papers, Maritime Sustainability Issues and Action Plan (Dec. 17,
2000) (on file with author), available at http:lwww.peer.orgldocsldodlnavyworking.pdf.
148. Id. at 2.
149. In the action plan, the precautionary approach is considered, "a resource preservation and
conservation philosophy where in the absence of scientific information to the contrary, the
regulator assumes that the proposed DoD activity will harm the environment." Id. at 1.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Id. at 3. The DoD felt that "substantial buffer areas around sensitive resources such as
marine sanctuaries and coral reefs were being imposed in order to guarantee their protection from
military acitivities." Id. When acoustic operations are being performed, visual monitoring is
deemed essential to identify marine mammals in the area and as such precludes night-time
operations as visual surveys could not be permitted. Id. Use of explosives was being interpreted
to mean that an animal could always be injured or killed which did not allow for ordnance testing
and training. Id.
152. Bethurem, supra note 137, at 120-22.
153. RRPI 2002 "was the product of over 100 days of interagency consultation and
coordination." Thomas N. Ledvina, Defending America - A Question of Balance: The
Department of Defense's Range and Readiness Preservation Initiative, in Federal Lands and
Natural Resources Law 163, 179 (ALI-ABA Conference, Sept. 18-19, 2003), WL SJ023 ALI-
ABA 163.
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tions. 154 It was not until the 2004 fiscal year allocations, which occurred
after the issuance of the opinion in NRDC v. Evans, that Congress
accepted the next two provisions of the RRPI package: amendments to
the MMPA and the ESA.1
55
IV. THE STRAW THAT BROKE THE CAMEL'S BACK -
NRDC v. EVANS
A. Background to the Suit
The United States officially implemented the use of low-frequency
sonar on July 16, 2002,156 when the National Marine Fisheries Services
(NMFS) issued a Final Rule governing the unintentional takings of
small numbers of marine mammals incidental to the operation of the
Navy's Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) 57 Low
Frequency Active Sonar (LFAS). 158 The scope of the Final Rule was
perceived by some civil society organizations to be extremely broad and,
in response, the Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC) lead 5 9 a
lawsuit in California against Donald Evans, the Secretary of Commerce,
claiming that NMFS improperly approved the use of LFAS in as much
as seventy-five percent of the world's oceans in violation of the MMPA,
ESA, NEPA, and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).16° The
NRDC sought a permanent injunction to prevent the peacetime use of
LFAS technology for training, testing and routine operations.' 61 The
154. Two conservation provisions were passed as well as an amendment to the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act. Id. at 179-80.
155. The opinion was issued on August 26, 2003, and the fiscal year allocations for 2004
occurred on November 24, 2003.
156. NRDC asserts that the LFA sonar was a Navy secret until 1994 at which point NRDC
began investigating rumors of sound experiments taking place off the coast of California. At this
point, the existence of LFA was discovered and that it had already been field-tested in twenty-two
operations. After some prodding, the Navy agreed to study the effects of the LFAS on marine life.
Dick Russell, Bad Vibes, ONEARTH MAGAZINE, Summer 2002.
157. SURTASS is a passive surveillance system deployed on the surface of the ocean. The
LFA system is an active sonar employed together with the SURTASS when the target is too quiet
to be detected by the passive SURTASS alone. See United States of America Department of the
Navy, SURTASS LFA Systems Description, http://www.surtass-lfa-eis.com/Description/index.
htm (last visited July 31, 2005).
158. The application for incidental takings was first made by the Navy to the National Marine
Fisheries Service on August 12, 1999. Final Rule, supra note 27.
159. Other plaintiffs included The Humane Society of the United States, Cetacean Society
International, League for Coastal Protection, Ocean Futures Society, and Jean-Michel Cousteau as
an interested individual.
160. Because of issues of standing, the NRDC's only recourse was to bring suit under the
Administrative Procedures Act where the standard of review was whether the NMFS's decision
granting the final rule was arbitrary and capricious. NRDC v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1139-
40 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
161. Id. at 1129.
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NRDC further claimed that the Navy issued an inadequate EIS in viola-
tion of NEPA.162
B. The Injunction & Settlement
Magistrate Elizabeth Laporte cautiously weighed the interests of
the domestic and international public "in the survival and flourishing of
marine mammals and endangered species, as well as a healthy marine
environment" against the public interest "in protecting national security
by ensuring military preparedness and the safety of those serving in the
military from attacks by hostile submarines." 163 The court addressed
each piece of legislation alleged to be violated in the final rule (MMPA,
NEPA, & ESA) and the respective arguments advanced by each party.
The court found that the Navy's argument prevailed on some issues, but
failed to persuade the court that it did not act arbitrarily and capriciously
on other issues.
The final result was a permanent injunction "carefully tailored to
reduce the risk to marine mammals and endangered species by restrict-
ing the sonar's use in areas that are particularly rich in marine life, while
still allowing the Navy to use this technology for testing and training in
a variety of oceanic conditions." '64 Furthermore, the injunction was
only to be in place "until the defendants correct the violations identified
in this opinion."
' 165
This thoughtful compromise allowed the Navy to train and test the
LFA sonar during times of peace, but not without restriction. The Navy
was required to revisit those parameters found to have been decided in
an arbitrary and capricious manner. Magistrate LaPorte did take the
Navy's interests to heart, but also recognized that it was the Navy itself
who has "already delayed deployment by its own failure originally to
timely initiate the required environmental processes ... to ensure that
decisions reflect environmental values, to avoid later delay, and to head
off potential conflicts.' 6 6 After the injunction, the Navy entered into a
settlement agreement with the plaintiffs regarding low-frequency sonar
restricting use of the system to a "defined and limited area of the west-
ern North Pacific Ocean." 167 In order to avoid such any further interrup-
162. Id.
163. NRDC v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
164. Id. at 1191.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Press Statement, National Resource Defense Council, Statement from Joel Reynolds,
NRDC, Regarding Navy LFA Settlement (Oct. 13, 2003), available at http://www.nrdc.org/
media/pressreleases/031013a.asp.
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tion with its use of high-intensity sonar, in particular the use of mid-
frequency sonar, the Navy continued to pursue its RRPI legislation.
The DoD identifies increased litigation as an issue of encroach-
ment. In a statement before the House Committee on Resources con-
ceming the RRPI, Rear Admiral Robert T. Moeller, specifically
identified the initial court order limiting the use SURTASS LFA tech-
nology as an issue of concern. 168 He stated that the, "Navy now finds
the deployment and operation of one of our most important national
security assets constrained by a Federal court as a result of litigation
brought by environmental groups."' 169 The DoD professes that there has
been a six-year delay and over ten million dollars spent on a Scientific
Research Project all in connection with the SURTASS LFA, further
indicating that the only fruit of their labor has been the injunction, settle-
ment, and the identification of the structural issues within the MMPA.17 °
In this specific case, one must question the proposition that the
Navy has been encroached upon by the MMPA and the litigation. The
burden on a plaintiff of showing that a decision made during the EIS
process was arbitrary and capricious is a significant one, and further
deference is given to the interpreting agency. In addition, the provisions
for public comment during the EIS process are in place to avoid the very
litigation that took place in this case. Used correctly, the public com-
ments should assist in the strengthening base of informational data of the
EIS and allow for solid decision-making by also taking into considera-
tion other viewpoints. Had the Navy only taken more care during the
EIS process, it would not have faced the litigation and surely, the NRDC
would not have succeeded if it nevertheless sought an injunction. As
Magistrate LaPorte indicated, the Navy is not the victim of rapaciously
litigating environmental organizations; it has rather reaped the seeds
which it has sown, by not basing the decisional criteria supporting the
parameters of use of SURTASS LFA technology on informed data and
analysis.
Rather than correct the violations identified by the court to be in
conformance with the MMPA, the DoD continued its efforts to change
the requirements of the MMPA. Three months after the settlement
agreement, the Navy succeeded and the FY 2004 Budget Authorization
was passed with three significant amendments to the MMPA.
V. NRDC V EVANS AND THE RRPI AMENDMENTS TO THE MMPA
RRPI legislation encapsulated in the fiscal year 2004 budget appro-
168. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. Evans, 232 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
169. Statement of Rear Admiral Moeller, supra note 8.
170. DoD Range and Readiness Preservation Initiative (RRPI), supra note 5, at slides 9-11.
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priations essentially altered the MMPA in three different areas: a defini-
tional alteration, the creation of an exemption, and the inclusion of
special provisions under the requirements for military readiness activi-
ties. Some of the alterations directly address the issues raised under the
NRDC litigation, but all deal with changes for military readiness
activities.
A. Military Readiness Activities
The MMPA amendments refer to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
("MBTA") for the definition of a military readiness activity. 7' The
MBTA had also been amended as part of the RRPI platform during the
previous fiscal year defense authorization172 to create an exception for
the incidental taking of migratory birds during military readiness activi-
ties.' 173 The MBTA defines a military readiness activity as "(A) all train-
ing and operations of the Armed Forces that relate to combat; and (B)
the adequate and realistic testing of military equipment, vehicles, weap-
ons, and sensors for proper operation and suitability for combat use."' 74
Not included in the scope of military readiness activities are "the routine
operation of installation operating support functions, such as administra-
tive offices, military exchanges, commissaries, water treatment facilities,
storage facilities, schools, housing, motor pools, laundries, morale, wel-
fare, and recreation activities, shops, and mess halls."' 7 5 Further activi-
ties not included in the definition are the operation of industrial activities
or the construction nor demolition of facilities used for any of those
routine operations previously identified.
7 6
This definition provides wide latitude and great potential for an
activity on a Naval Base or vessel to be considered a military readiness
activity. The DoD touts its RRPI legislative component as being, "nar-
rowly-tailored to protect military readiness activities, not the whole
171. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (2005).
172. Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. 107-314,
§ 315, 116 Stat. 2458 (2002).
173. This was the sole amendment that made in through Congress after the initial introduction
of the RRPI legislative package. The amendments were in response to an injunction issued by the
court in a case where the US Navy was sued under the MBTA for the incidental taking of non-
endangered migratory birds during military training exercises using live fire on the island of
Farallon de Medinilla. Centre for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C.
2002). The district court granted a preliminary injunction and the court of appeals stayed the
injunction. Had Congress not intervened with the amendment to the MBTA, the injunction,
"could have applied to virtually every military training range." Ledvina, supra note 155, at 171.
After the RRPI amendments the case was dismissed for mootness on appeal. Id.
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scope of Defense Department activities."' 77 DoD further argues that this
excludes "activities that have traditionally been of greatest concern to
state and federal regulators, and includes only uniquely military activi-
ties - what DoD does that is unlike any other governmental or private
activity."' 78 As the unique military activities are what differentiates the
DoD's "business" from that of another type of operation or company,
the scope and bounds of the legislative changes are limited to those
activities, military readiness, which allow the DoD to discharge its
unique duty.' 
79
It is true that the DoD has limited its amendments only to military
readiness activities both in the MMPA and MBTA. 80 Whether this can
be considered a narrowly-tailored amendment is debatable. Arguably all
activities beyond the day-to-day living of a branch of the military are
training and operations that relate to combat and to testing of equipment.
Jogging along the beach may be preparing for combat training, as is
using live ordnance in a simulated war maneuver. Success in military
readiness "will depend on having a modernized joint training infrastruc-
ture that supports realistic, combined forces, force-on-force training for
our military," as the conflicts that we are facing are "likely to be short-
notice, 'come-as-you-are' events," which means that the training must
be as intense during times of peace as it is during preparation for war. 8"
Furthermore, it is the Secretary of Defense who determines what a mili-
tary readiness activity is and, if these interpretations are ever challenged
through the courts, deference will be giving to the DoD's interpretation,
and it would be difficult to argue otherwise. 82
177. Critical Challenges Confronting National Security-Continuing Encroachment Threatens
Force Readiness Before the House Comm. on Government Reform Oversight, 107th Cong. (2002)
(Statement of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness), Dr. Paul W. Mayberry, & Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, Jr.).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. The ESA does not take into account military readiness activities as it deals with
designating critical habitat. However, it could have narrowly tailored the ESA for those areas
designated for its use as only for its use for military readiness activities, but it did not.
181. Critical Challenges Confronting National Security-Continuing Encroachment Threatens
Force Readiness Before the House Comm. on Government Reform Oversight, 107th Cong. (2002)
(Statement of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness), Dr. Paul W. Mayberry, & Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), Mr. Raymond F. DuBois, Jr.). The
statement compared the war of terror which we are facing today to that of Operation Desert Storm
where the military had months to prepare for the actual combat and was, consequently, efficiently
successful.
182. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S,. 837 (1984). The
Chevron doctrine would only be invoked if the court finds that the statutory language is
ambiguous or silent. Id. According to the Chevron doctrine, the administering agency is the
interpreting agency, which under the MBTA would fall under the Secretary of the Interior.
However, the amendments specifically provide that the military readiness activities are to be
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B. Altering the Definition of 'Harassment'
The first amendment to the MMPA was to create an alternate defi-
nition of the word "harassment" for the purposes of military activities
and scientific research activities conducted by or on behalf of the Fed-
eral Government. The MMPA divides harassment into two levels: Level
A and Level B.' 83 Level A harassment addresses the potential of an act
to injure a marine mammal and Level B harassment addresses the poten-
tial of an act to disturb a marine mammal by causing disruption of
behavioral patterns.' 84 The DoD, through the amendments, has adjusted
Level A harassment, as applicable to a military readiness activity or a
scientific research activity conducted on behalf of the Federal Govern-
ment, to address any act that injures or has the significant potential to
injure.'85 This means instead of an activity simply having the potential
to injure, there now has to be actual injury or a significant potential to
injure, which lessens the burden quite extensively. Level B harassment,
for the purposes of military readiness or Federal Government scientific
research, is now defined as any act that disturbs or is likely to disturb by
causing disruption of natural behavioral patterns to a point where such
behavioral patterns are abandoned or significantly altered.' 8 6 Again, the
standard is shifted from one finding harassment when there is a potential
of disturbance to a showing that the activity will actually disturb or is
likely to disturb, and not just to behavioral patterns, but only to those
patterns that are abandoned or significantly altered.
In the Final Rule, the Navy interpreted Level B harassment to occur
when "there is a significant behavioral change in a biologically impor-
tant activity, such as breeding, migration or sheltering."' 187 This inter-
pretation parallels more closely the amended definition for military
readiness activities than the literal definitions in the statute. Yet, in the
litigation of NRDC v. Evans, the court found that the use of the Navy's
definition, albeit erroneous, did not cause any harm and that the word
disruption in and of itself implicates a significant change, thus their
interpretation was not inconsistent with the definition under the
MMPA. 88 The court's findings exemplify the fact that the Navy did
have room to maneuver within the definition of harassment contained in
authorized by the Secretary of Defense, thus it is the Secretary of Defense who will determine
what a military readiness activity is under the statute. See 16 U.S.C § 703 note (2005).
183. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1362(18) (2003).
184. Id. (emphasis provided).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Final Rule, supra note 27, at 46721-22.
188. NRDC, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1129.
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the MMPA as it had stood, demonstrating that the definition of Level B
harassment never encroached upon its LFAS activities.
By changing the potential standard to one of significant potential or
likeliness, the entire MMPA analysis is shifted from the dependable pre-
cautionary standard to one of uncertainty and guesswork.18 9 Before a
military readiness or scientific research activity takes place, a decision
will be made as to whether that activity has significant potential to harm
or is likely to disturb, "requiring a higher degree of proof than science is
currently able to provide for many types of serious impacts, such as
reduced calving rates." 19° Thus, the potential for error, as well as the
likelihood of marine mammals being harmed or injured, is significantly
increased. To date, there is scant evidence on the effects of acoustic
trauma to the migration, breeding, feeding and sheltering habits of
marine mammals. Further the requirement of demonstrating actual
injury for harassment before the fact becomes exceedingly difficult since
such facts are likely to arise only through an after-the-fact evaluation.
This is especially true with a device that has potential to harm at such
wide-spread distances as high-intensity sonar is able, so that actual
injury occurs when the dead or injured bodies of marine mammals are
discovered.
Moreover, one questions why the alternate definition extends not
only to military readiness activities, but also scientific research activities
funded by the Federal government. The MMPA contains special provi-
sions for scientific research which will allow for the issue of a permit for
any takings of marine mammals. A logical interpretation for why this
clause was also expanded for scientific research is that it is meant to
apply to scientific research dealing with weapons development. The
inclusion of scientific research will allow for greater leeway for the
Navy to test its weapons or invasive sonar devices which will potentially
injure or disturb marine mammals and lift those activities as well to the
higher standard of either causing actual injury or disturbance or create a
significant potential for injury or likelihood of disturbance.
189. The precautionary principle "counsels serious contemplation of regulatory action in the
face of evidence of health and environmental risk, even before the magnitude of risk is necessarily
known or any harm manifested." David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the
Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315, 1315 (2003). When incorporated into the
decision-making process, this principle advises to rather err on the side of caution if faced with
uncertain factors.
190. Natural Resource Defense Council, Written Statement on Proposals to Amend the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 submitted to the House Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Military Readiness, pursuant to the Subcommittee Hearing on environmental
Legislative Proposals (March 13, 2003), available at http://www.nrdc.org/wildlife/marine/cmmpa
0303.asp.
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C. Exemption
The second amendment to the MMPA attaches an entire new sub-
section 'f allowing for exemptions under the MMPA for reasons of
national defense. 9 1 Under this new provision, the Secretary of Defense
need only get the approval of either the Secretary of Commerce or the
Secretary of the Interior in order to exempt for a renewable maximum of
two years any "category of actions ... or its components."'' 92 The only
requisite is that the exemption be necessary for national defense. Fur-
thermore, the only reporting requirement under this exemption provision
is that of the submitting to "the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representative and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate notice describing the exemption and the reasons therefor."' 93
Waiver provisions in environmental legislation have been viewed
as acceptable solutions to allow for those extraordinary times in which
compliance with such laws may jeopardize the national security. "Con-
gress has inserted provisions into each of the major environmental laws
(except NEPA) permitting its waiver in exigent circumstances."' 94 This
modified MMPA waiver amendment falls quite short of the normal
meaning of exigent circumstances, only requiring it to be necessary for
national defense, an expansive phrase that may capture numerous situa-
tions potentially including, and in fact most likely meant to include,
those situations that involve military readiness and preparation.
Additionally, exemptions are traditionally narrowly tailored to
address the situation at hand where an exigent circumstance requires
either non-compliance with the law or an adjustment of compliance
requirements. The MMPA amendments allow for the Navy to be effec-
tively exempt from compliance for a period of two years, forgoing any
regular reporting requirements, save the initial notification to the House
and Senate Committees. Thus, not only is the period of exemption
extensive, but it also does not have to be tailored in any way to the
situation on hand. Furthermore there is no requirement for Congress or
the Secretary of Defense to monitor the activities under the exemption
(beyond the normal monitoring functions of the independent Marine
Mammal Commission and its annual Congressional report) for the two-
year period. This exemption grants significant power to the Secretary of
Defense, and, in turn, into the hands of the Navy who may be exempted
from MMPA provisions for a significant period of time and is under no
191. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. 108-136, § 319,
117 Stat. 1392, 1434 (2004).
192. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(f) (2005).
193. Id. § 1371(0(4).
194. STEPHEN Dycus, supra note 9, at 149.
[Vol. 59:577
NAVAL SECURITY NEEDS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
additional obligation to monitor or report the activities affecting these
mammals which the Federal government is required to protect.
D. Special Provisions for Military Readiness Activities
The final alteration to the Marine Mammal Protection Act focuses
in on the allowable incidental taking and harassment of small numbers
of marine mammals and provides military readiness activities with spe-
cial provisions and adjustments to the normal MMPA procedural
requirements. The applicable provisions are divided into two sections:
one discussing the incidental, but not intentional, taking of marine mam-
mals19 and the other discussing the incidental taking of marine mam-
mals by harassment.196
1. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Under the original provisions of the MMPA, incidental takings and
harassment include requirements that provide for notice in the Federal
Register, in newspapers of general circulation, and through the appropri-
ate electronic media, including provisions to target local communities
which may be affected.' 97 Both provisions also include an opportunity
for public comment.' 98 The amendments significantly decrease the
requirements for notice by obliging the Secretary to provide notice only
in the Federal Register. 99 It is hard to find a purpose served by limiting
the notice provisions to publication only in the Federal Register. The
provisions for non-military readiness activities are specific to alerting
not only the general public, but also the population directly affected
along the specified coastal areas.200 It is excessively burdensome that
the coastal populations and the public will now have to monitor the Fed-
eral Register to discover if the Navy is conducting activities involving
takings that may affect their shoreline and the marine life living there.
The concept of notice is just that: to notify potentially affected parties of
activities so that they can be aware of the activities happening in the area
surrounding their property and further have an opportunity to protect
themselves and provide their perspective. The military activities have
the potential to be even more damaging than any citizen applying for a
permit, yet the Navy has less of a requirement to inform the public.
Explanations for such a provision are few; it could effectively be an
195. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(5)(A)(i) (2005).
196. Id. § 1371(5)(D)(i) (2005).
197. Id. § 1371(5)(A)(i), (D)(iii) (2005).
198. Id.
199. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. 108-136, § 319, 117
Stat. 1392, 1434 (2004).
200. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(5)(A)(i), (D)(iii) (2005).
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attempt to avoid public scrutiny from the takings falling under a military
readiness activity.
In granting a taking permit, an evaluation of the method of the tak-
ing during the activity is made by the Secretary who authorizes those
methods which would have the least practical impact on the marine
mammal species or stock. The amendment inserts language requiring
that the Secretary consider for the purposes of military readiness activi-
ties when making the authorization of taking methods three additional
aspects: personnel safety, practicality of implementation, and impact on
effectiveness of the military readiness activity.20 1 Moreover, it is further
mandated that before making the required determination, the Secretary
shall consult with the DoD regarding these three additional considera-
tions.2" 2 This directly addresses the concern the Navy has had that the
MMPA, as it was originally enacted, did not address military readiness
concerns and rather was aimed at protecting whales from commercial
exploitation and preventing dolphins and other marine mammals from
accidental death or injury during commercial fishing operations.2 °3
These amendments address the Navy's concern and force the Secretary
to consider the weighty interest of military readiness. This amendment
shifts the focus of consideration from the interests of the mammals to the
interests of the DoD when dealing with a military readiness activity. An
ordinary citizen applying for a permit is forced to pay particular atten-
tion to rookeries, mating grounds, and areas of similar significance and
on the availability of such species of stocks for subsistence use.2" A
military readiness activity prioritizes the impact of not performing the
activity before the impact on marine mammals. One could argue that
the new amendments merely even out the military considerations that
were not incorporated in the original act. However, when the added
proviso of consulting the Secretary of Defense before authorizing of the
method of taking so that he or she may advocate on behalf of the Navy,
is taken into consideration, there is no even playing field: the advantage
clearly falls to the military.
2. NUMERICAL & GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS
The final special amendments under incidental takings and takings
by harassment directly address issues brought up during NRDC v. Evans.
These include what the Navy considers structural deficiencies in the
201. Id. § 1371(5)(A)(ii), (D)(vi) (2005).
202. Id. § 1371(5)(A)(ii), (D)(vi) (2005).
203. Statement of Rear Admiral Moeller, supra note 8.
204. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(5)(A)(i)(II)(aa), (D)(ii)(I)
(2005).
[Vol. 59:577
NAVAL SECURITY NEEDS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
MMPA identified as the "small numbers" and "specific geographic
region" requirements.20 5 With regards to military readiness activities,
the Navy is not subject to either of these two requirements.
a. Specified Geographic Region
Under incidental takings, suspension of incidental takings and tak-
ings by harassment, °6 the Navy is not subject to the "specified geo-
graphic region" requirement. In NRDC v. Evans, NRDC argued that the
identified "provinces" were gargantuan in scale and far too large to meet
the MMPA's specified geographic region requirement.2 07 The military
countered that the requirement of a specified geographic region meant a
region which was no larger than necessary to accomplish the specified
activity.20 8 The court was persuaded by NRDC's argument in this case
finding that the Final Rule violated the MMPA by failing to limit the
take of marine mammals to a specified geographic region and in order to
comply with the MMPA, the Navy must only be authorized to operate in
a limited number of geographical regions at any given time.20 9 The
court recognized that SURTASS LFA required fairly large geographic
regions (the court did not find that the Navy's geographic regions were
devised in an arbitrary and capricious manner), yet there was nothing
limiting the Navy from operating in all fifty-four provinces in a particu-
lar year and that the lack of any written limitation was cause to find that
this part of the Final Rule was arbitrary and capricious.
210
To correct the deficiency in the Final Rule, all the Navy was
required to do was to write in limitations on the geographic regions. At
that point in the litigation, the Navy only had two vessels capable of
using LFAS technology, and the Navy had argued that because of this it
would in fact be limited to operating in specified geographic regions
each year. If this was the case, it would not have been difficult to esti-
mate the regions and to alter the Final Rule to encompass this, thus satis-
fying the court.2 1 Instead, the Navy opted for a full exemption in the
amendments, thus allowing the use of mid-frequency sonar to now be
unlimited as to geographical region.
205. DoD Range and Readiness Preservation Initiative (RRPI), supra note 5, at slide 4.
206. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(5)(A), (B) & (C) (2005)
(respectively).
207. Natural Resouces Defense Council v. Evans, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1142 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
208. Id. at 1142.
209. Id. at 1147.
210. Id. 1142-47.
211. Id. at 1146.
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b. Small Numbers
Under the incidental takings and the takings by harassment, the
Navy is further exempted from the words "small numbers. 212 This
again was a point of contention in the NRDC litigation. NRDC had
claimed that the Navy had used an erroneous definition of small num-
bers in its Final Rule as the Navy had defined small numbers to mean a
portion of a marine mammal species or stock whose taking would have a
negligible impact on that species or stock.2 3 The NRDC asserted that
small numbers and negligible impact were two separate requirements
and should be construed so that they have their own independent
effect.2" 4 Thus the Navy's definition, for example, may allow for a tak-
ing of Level B harassment of twelve percent of the stock of elephant
seals. If construed together, as the Navy did, that twelve percent may be
considered a portion small enough to have a negligible impact on the
species or stock. Yet, if the negligible impact and small numbers
requirements are construed separately, there might still be an arguably
negligible impact, but the numbers of the taking by harassment may not
be "small" at all. The court found that the legislatively history and case
precedent supported the NRDC that the two requirements were indepen-
dent requirements and the Final Rule should take into account their inde-
pendent effects.215
The Navy is now exempt from assuring that the takings of marine
mammals when it uses its high-intensity sonar technology remains
small. The Navy is only required to ensure that there is no non-negligi-
ble impact on the population as a whole. Unfortunately, the combina-
tion of the small numbers exemptions and the specific geographic region
exemption do not provide for the protection of populations of marine
mammals. Arguably the Navy could have a taking of marine mammals
which decimates a local population as long as the impact on the species
as a whole is negligible.
E. A Pound of Cure for an Ounce of Pain
Traditionally, encroachment issues arise as urban populations
expand closer to military areas.2" 6 As the majority of land under DoD
stewardship is open space and wilderness used for training, buffer zones,
and ranges, animals, some of which are endangered, inhabit those areas
causing additional responsibility for the military and limiting the activi-
212. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(5)(F) (2005).
213. NRDC, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
214. Id. at 1147-53.
215. Id.
216. DoD Range and Readiness Preservation Initiative, supra note 5, at slides 4-5.
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ties that they may perform.2 17 Another method of encroachment identi-
fied by the military is caused by the increase in environmental
legislation, which in turn provides for increased regulation and adminis-
trative burdens on military activities while concurrently allowing for
increased opportunity for litigation against a branch of the armed forces.
Within the last thirty years, environmental legislation has increased four-
fold causing compliance issues as, due to the nature of the military's
operations, for the Navy and its operations.218
In the case of the MMPA, however, cries of encroachment are
turned on their heads. The MMPA was enacted in 1972.219 The defini-
tion of harassment has remained intact until this past 2003 amendment
and has not "encroached" upon the Navy any more so than it has in the
past thirty-three years (amendments have been made nine times in the
last thirty-two years, including the latest military readiness provi-
sions). 220 It is essential to recognize that in this case, it is not the marine
mammals that are trodding upon naval ground, but it is the Navy who is
encroaching upon the space and area of the marine mammals. As tech-
nology develops and becomes more pervasive, it is this technology that
interferes, harasses, and kills the mammals. It is legitimate for the mili-
tary to protest that environmental legislation is becoming more and more
confining to their activities, however, the military must also recognize
the fact that their activities are becoming more dangerous and more per-
vasive, and thus more necessary to regulate.
The amendments provide wide exemptions to the Navy and its
operations. The terms are vague and subject to broad interpretation, and
courts are likely to provide considerable deference to the DoD's inter-
pretation. Furthermore, the amendments remove a significant amount of
accountability by the Navy and provide sweeping power and influence
to the DoD. These amendments fall short of being narrowly tailored to
the situation, or of at least providing some sort of check and balance to
the new authorities vested under the amendments, and furthermore, the
amendments provide broad exemptions without again the requisite check
and balance or limitation to specific situations of need.
Finally the strict protective mechanisms of the MMPA indicate the
priority the public places on the protection of marine mammals. The
amendments of the MMPA go above and beyond what is necessary to
achieve the goal of flexibility for the military. The amendments remove
the precautionary standard of the MMPA, change the definitions of key
217. Ledvina, supra note 153, at 167-69.
218. DoD Range and Readiness Preservation Initiative (RRPI), supra note 5, at slide 6.
219. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (2005).
220. Id.
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provisions providing the Navy with the power and ability to destroy
local populations of marine mammals, outside of the eye of public
notice.
VI. CONCLUSION: OUR SECURITY AT WHAT EXPENSE?
A decade later, the Pentagon's proposed legislation begs the ques-
tion: Should national defense come at the expense of what the military is
supposed to be defending?22'
RRPI amendments, which were in process before September elev-
enth, rode the wave of public insecurity of another terrorist attack to
move forward the legislative package. However, the MMPA amend-
ments stand out from the other RRPI provisions as there is little connec-
tion between fighting the war on terror and key provisions of the
MMPA. No country with a substantial submarine program is currently
construed (at least in public) as an enemy state, meaning that the critical
need for active sonar is some time off. And, at this point, terrorists, to
our knowledge do not have access to quiet diesel submarines as instru-
ments of destruction.
It is also questionable if the military had no choice but to amend the
MMPA to reach their goal. Perhaps the goal is not necessarily to have
more flexibility in the use of the sonar, but rather to save money
researching other alternatives, or using other technology on hand. The
Navy could quite possibly have found a technical alternative to such
extremely powerful pinging by using lots of sonic sources floating on
ships or on the sea beds. However such an endeavor would be quite
costly due to the implementation and maintenance of such a system.
The military's encroachment agenda attached itself to the momen-
tum of September eleventh couched in the necessity for 'military readi-
ness.' Through these reforms the DoD rid itself of environmental
burdens that it ironically claims forms a part of their every day experi-
ence and an essential part of their mission. The RRPI amendments to
the MMPA, which are incompatible with the war on terror and unneces-
sary according to NRDC litigation, solve a short-term problem for the
Navy, but present long-term problems for not only America, but also for
the rest of the world dependant on the oceanic eco-system. The ocean
remains the wide, vast area it was once before and the only encroach-
ment arises from the technology of the Navy upon the marine life in the
sea. The MMPA amendments are limited solely to those situations
which involve combat training. Yet, it is precisely those situations that
221. DoD permits, which have been issued since 1994, are typically given for missile firings,
which may cause seals to fatally stampede, or for trials in which tons of high explosives are
detonated underwater. Letter from Joel Reynolds & Michael Jasny, supra note 30.
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should cause us concern, and should at least be given the dignity of
careful thought before taking place and accordingly limited to time and
place in order to protect those animals. 2  In the end, it may be that
global opinion forces the United States to revisit these amendments. As
international bodies call on their members to use restraint and precaution
with such technology, pressure will come to bear on the United States to
also limit its use of high-intensity sonar. 223 As our weapons become
more pervasive, and encroach upon other species' territories, the answer
should not lie in circumventing long-standing environmental legislation,
but rather rigorous efforts of compliance to preserve the development of
alternative technologies.
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